We consider a repeated interaction between a manufacturing firm and a subcontractor. The relationship between the two parties is characterized 1) by moral hazard, 2) by the fact that they do not have perfect knowledge about the base cost level of the project which is carried out by a subcontractor (the parties only have identical a priori beliefs). We consider a two-period model where the players can update their estimate of the base cost level according to incoming information. Exit relationships, where the firm signs one-period contracts with different subcontractors, are compared to voice relationships, where both partners commit to a two-period interaction and due to communication between the partners additional information about the base cost level is revealed between the periods. It is shown that in such a dynamic framework with common uncertainty the quality of the additional information plays a crucial role in determining the characteristics of the optimal relationship: voice-based strategies governed by long term contracts are preferable if the precision of the additional information about the base cost level is high. If the precision of the additional signal is low, exit strategies with frequent changes of the subcontractors are optimal for the manufacturer.
Introduction
Over the last decade there is a growing interest in industrial supplier relationships and relationship management. Three approaches in the literature can be identified, which investigate the optimal mode of governance to structure the relationship between a firm and its supplier(s). First, it has been realized by transaction cost economics that the specificity of an investment by either party plays a crucial role. If investments specific to the relationship between the firm and the supplier have to be made, then transactions in the spot market on a short term basis are not effective due to the threat of hold up. Long term relationships become necessary. Second, considerations based on game theoretic models suggest that the incentive of opportunism might be overcome if transactions are repeated over time. If the benefit of the long term transaction is larger than the benefit of opportunistic behavior, then the parties cooperate in equilibrium. If the parties value future payoffs highly enough, then long term arrangements are possible. Third and finally, from an information economics point of view, uncertainty in the relationship can be reduced in the long term. Information exchange and learning can improve a priori information and can make the relationship more stable. These three approaches mentioned above are not mutually exclusive and in actual business relationships between a firm and its suppliers all the components work together and make one or the other organizational mode more preferable.
In this work we focus on the information economics point of view and address the question under which circumstances a long term arrangement between a manufacturer and its suppliers is preferable to a arm's length relationship. The starting point of our analysis is Helper's exit-voice framework of supplier relations, see e.g. Helper (1991 Helper ( , 1993 . Helper extends Hirschman's approach of exit or voice as a method of problem solving to describe a firm's choice of its relation to its suppliers. According to Helper, exit and voice strategies can be distinguished with regard to 2 dimensions: level of (strategic) commitment of the parties and level of information exchange between the parties. A voice-based strategy between a firm and its supplier is characterized by a high level of commitment and a high level of information exchange. A high level of commitment means that the supplier knows that the firm will continue to purchase its products for some length of time, where assurance can be provided (e.g.) by a long-term contract. High levels of information exchange refer to the fact that not only price information is exchanged between the parties. In contrast to this, an exit strategy requires low commitment and low levels of information exchange.
An exit relationship between the manufacturer and its supplier is governed by an arm's length contract and only price information is communicated.
In several papers this framework has been used to compare the arrangements between manufacturers and their suppliers in the automobile industry; see Helper (1991 Helper ( , 1993 and Helper and Sako (1995a) for a comparison of US and Japan practices, and Helper and Sako (1995b) for a comparison with European firms. Standard arguments in favor of voice relationships include e.g. reduced inefficiencies in the production process and the supply chain and reduction of contracting costs due to relationships based on trust and reputation. The crucial point is the increase in information exchange between partners leading to a better understanding of the overall design and production process. Japanese manufacturing firms and their suppliers who rely on long term relationships typically open up information channels by interlocking directorship, regular meetings of the company, and exchange of executives and managers as well as engineers (Tabeta [1998] , see also McMillan [1990 McMillan [ , 1995 ). On the other hand, the reduction of competitive pressure on the subcontractor (e.g. contract bidding) and the reduced flexibility of the producer to react to changes in demand are often seen as disadvantages of long term commitment.
Here we try to provide insight into a different aspect of voice relationships. We will introduce a principal-agent model, which incorporates the two key dimensions in supplier relationships, commitment and information exchange, and we will show that exit relationships might be more efficient even in a completely static market environment, where flexibility and adverse selection are no issue, if a priori both sides are uncertain about the complexity of the task to be carried out by the subcontractor. The intuitive reason is that in long term relationships common uncertainty leads to positive correlation between the single period payoffs of the supplier, which means that the risk premium increases in a convex way with the duration of the relationship. There are several possible reasons for the emergence of such a common uncertainty of supplier and manufacturer. For example, for projects of high complexity, the amount of work and resources which is necessary to complete the project is uncertain in advance 1 . Cultural and regulatory differences might also lead to common uncertainty if the partners are located in different countries. Given the current trend to offshore sourcing and production (see Arndt [2001] ) the importance of this source is evident. We will demonstrate that in the presence of common uncertainty the predictions of Helper's analysis hold also in terms of pure agency costs: the preferability of long term commitment depends on the levels of information exchange. A high level of information exchange makes long term commitment preferable. If it is low, then short term arrangements are better.
Several authors have demonstrated the usefulness of the principal agent paradigm for the analysis of problems in supply-chain management. See Tsay et al. (1999) for an overview and e.g. Baiman et al. (2001) for a recent application. However, as Plambeck and Zenios (2000) note, "very few supply chain studies analyze multi-period contracts". This is certainly due to their inherent complexity (see Tsay et al. [1999] ). One notable exception which also refers to the exit-voice framework is Helper and Levine (1992) . They analyze a two-stage game with adverse selection and explain the choice of governance structure (exit or voice) by referring to the hold up problem inherent in the relationship between supplier and manufacturer. In different contexts some of the effects of the presence of common uncertainty in moral hazard models have been studied before. For example, Gibbons and Murphy (1992) illustrate the implications of uncertainty about the manager's ability and career concerns on the optimal contract design. Meyer [1995] and Meyer and Vickers [1997] also investigate explicit and implicit incentive effects in a dynamic framework with common uncertainty. They focus on the impact of comparative performance information on efficiency properties in a dynamic framework. Our setup is formally close to these models, but differs on several accounts. First, in contrast to these studies we deal with a case where the common uncertainty does not concern the ability of the agents but the characteristic of the project which is carried out by the subcontractor 2 . Second, we focus on the impact of the length of the relationship and the resulting differences of writing short and long term contracts. Finally, the previous studies of the effect of common uncertainty did not consider the possibility that additional information is received between the two periods which is a crucial ingredient in our analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the general framework and in section 3 we consider exit relationships governed by short term contracts. In section 4 we deal with voice relationships governed by long term contracts and also discuss renegotiation proof long term con- 2 We are aware of a single exception where uncertainty about job characteristics is considered, namely a model of job swapping in Meyer and Vickers (1997) . However, in their model an additional signal between the periods is not present.
tracts. In section 5 we compare the two cases -exit and voice relationships -and provide conditions under which one of the two modes is optimal. We conclude with section 6.
The General Framework
In this section we will briefly describe the basic setup underlying both models, exit and voice relationships. The framework we are using is based on a static moral hazard model introduced by Kawasaki and McMillan (1987) . Here, however, we consider a dynamic setup where a firm chooses from a pool of homogeneous subcontractors and has projects of identical complexity to be carried out by suppliers in two subsequent periods. In what follows we will always refer to the manufacturer/principal by using the female pronoun and to the subcontractor/agent by using the male pronoun. The actual or realized costs of each project can be observed after it has been finished, however, the firm cannot observe in how far the subcontractor has expended effort in order to minimize the costs of the project. If the subcontractor agrees to carry out the project, the costs are given by
where c * are the base costs of the project, ξ i denotes the effect of cost reducing actions of the subcontractor in period i and ω i is a normally distributed noise term with zero mean and variance σ 2 which is i.i.d. across periods. The subcontractor's disutility arising from the effort expended to reduce the cost of a project is
Note that effort is not directly observable by the firm. However, at the end of every period the firm can observe the overall costs of the project, c i , and thus can condition the payment to the subcontractor on the realized costs. The firm offers the subcontractor a variable compensation scheme indicating the payment the subcontractor will receive depending on c i . In case of an exit relationship the firm offers two one-period contracts (to potentially different subcontractors in each period), whereas in a voice relationship a two-period contract is signed at the beginning of period 1. Following a standard approach in the literature (see e.g. Kawasaki and McMillan [1987] , Holmström and Milgrom [1987] , Milgrom and Roberts [1992] ) we restrict our attention to contracts that are linear in the realized costs. The principal is assumed to be risk neutral. The agent is assumed to have CARA utility function of the form
, where λ > 0 is the degree of absolute risk aversion and u i is the agent's net payoff in period i. The net payoff in any period where he does not enter a contract with the principal is denoted by u 0 .
As discussed in the introduction, we relax the assumption that the manufacturer and the subcontractor have perfect information about the base cost level c * . We rather assume that both parties have identical a priori beliefs about this value, where at the beginning of period 1 the parties believe that c * is normally distributed with expected valuec 1 and variance σ 2 1,c . After the end of the first period, they update these beliefs using the information they have received during the period. In our model the amount of information which the parties receive during period 1 will depend on the type of relationship between the partners. In a voice relationship more information is generated in comparison to a short term exit relationship. In what follows the major goal is to analyze and describe the trade-off between the informational advantage of a voice relationship and the negative incentive effects of long term contracting in our dynamic framework. This will allow us to understand under which conditions it is beneficial for the principal to enter an exit or a voice relationship.
Exit Relationships
Let us first describe the timing in an exit relationship (see the time line in figure 1 ).
Insert Figure 1 here
At the beginning of period 1 she writes a one-period contract with a subcontractor. The beliefs about the base cost level are given by (c 1 , σ 2 1c ). After the end of the first period, the project has been carried out and the realized costs c 1 are observed. The supplier of the first period is paid according to the contract. The costs c 1 are observable by all potential subcontractors and, since c 1 + ξ 1 is an unbiased estimator of c * , all parties can use c 1 to update their beliefs about the base costs. Assuming that all parties have identical point beliefs ξ e 1 about the first period effort of the subcontractor 3 , Bayesian updating yields the following expectation and variance of a posteriori beliefs 3 Note that in equilibrium the beliefs ξ e 1 of all parties coincide with the equilibrium level of the first period effort. Hence, this assumption does not result in any restrictions.
(see e.g. De Groot [1970] ):
A different supplier is selected to carry out the second period's project and a new one-period contract is signed based on the updated beliefs. Note that in this setup the first period's supplier does not expect to be considered again in the second period and, therefore, ignores all intertemporal effects. Contracts in both periods are assumed to be linear and of the form
where b E i denotes the target cost level of the task (which in general does not coincide withc i ). The cost sharing parameter α E i ∈ [0, 1] determines which fraction of the deviation of the realized costs from the target costs is covered by the principal. Obviously, higher values of α E i correspond to weaker incentives for the subcontractor to try to lower the realized costs. The superscript 'E' indicates that we are dealing with exit relationships.
The problem of the principal now is to determine the optimal values of b E i and α E i such that the sum of the expected prices to be paid is minimized, given the agents' participation and incentive compatibility constraints. Since the principal does not have to take any intertemporal effects into account, the problem of finding the optimal contracts reduces to the task of twice designing the optimal contract for the one-period game. The implication of the uncertainty about c * is that, given the information set of the partners at the beginning of period i, the costs c i in period i appear as random variables with distribution
The calculation of the optimal contract in this case is standard, and the results are summarized in our first proposition (all proofs are in the Appendix).
Proposition 1 If the manufacturer relies on exit relationships, the incentive rate in the optimal short term contract for period i = 1, 2 has the form
and the manufacturer's expected price is given by
wherec 2 and σ 2 2,c are given by (3) and (4).
Note that the incentive rate does not depend on the expected value of c * , but only on the variance of the estimator of the base costs. This is due to the fact that wealth effects do not matter since the agent's utility function exhibits constant absolute risk aversion (see also Gibbons and Murphy [1992] ). Since the variance of the estimator decreases from period to period (see (4)), we can conclude that the incentive rates in exit relationships should increase over time.
Voice Relationships
Let us now turn to the case of a voice relationship between the manufacturer and the subcontractor. As pointed out above, in our model there are two main implications of a voice relationship. First, at the beginning of period 1 both parties commit to interact for both periods. Second, due to increased communication between the partners, additional information about the base cost level is obtained between the periods. To incorporate the information effect in our model, we assume that an additional signal about the base costs c * is observed by both partners. This noisy signal which we denote byĉ, is unbiased and may be written asĉ
where ∼ N (0, σ 2 s ) is assumed to be stochastically independent from ω i , i = 1, 2. If the parameter σ 2 s equals zero, the partners can exactly infer c * from their analysis after the first period.
It has been pointed out in the literature (e.g. Helper (1991) ) that voice relationships might be governed by explicit or implicit long term contracts. In this section we only consider explicit long term contracts where the two partners sign a contract governing the remuneration for both periods at the beginning of period 1, but we will comment on the option of implicit long term contracts in the next section. We again assume that the contracts are linear in all variables. In an explicit long term contract the firm offers the subcontractor a payment scheme of the form 4
If the subcontractor accepts the contract, he has to carry out two projects in the two subsequent periods in order to receive the amount p at the end of period 2 (see figure 2).
Insert Figure 2 here
The following proposition describes the characteristics of the optimal long term contract.
Proposition 2 If the manufacturer relies on a voice-based strategy, the incentive rates and the relative weight on the information variableĉ in the optimal long term contract are given by
The manufacturer's expected price reads
The expressions derived for the optimal contract in this case can be interpreted in an intuitive way. In fact, the problem of the principal can be decomposed into two problems. On the one hand, the principal has to determine the ratio between 1 − α 1 = 1 − α 2 and β such that the variance of the beliefs about c * is reduced as much as possible. On the other hand, she has to determine the optimal incentive rates given the resulting effective uncertainty about c * . The first problem is a statistical problem, namely to construct an estimator with minimal variance by determining the relative weights in a weighted sum of two estimators. One can easily see that
has to hold (see also Milgrom and Roberts [1992] , Banker and Datar [1989] ). Using this improved estimator, the effective variance of the beliefs about c * reduces tô
With regard to the second problem, if we would now consider a long term contract without an additional signalĉ and would replace σ 2 1,c byσ 2 c in the expressions of the optimal incentive rates for such a contract, we would end up with exactly the same result as in proposition 2. Note also that if σ 2 s = 0 and the signal is used optimally, the agent behaves in the long term contract as if there is no a priori common uncertainty about c * . Since incentive rates in the optimal short and long term contracts coincide in the absence of common uncertainty, the incentive rates are in such a case exactly as those given by Kawasaki and MacMillan [1987] for the static model without common uncertainty.
The optimal long term contract characterized in proposition 2 has been derived under the assumption that both parties can commit not to renegotiate the contract terms at the beginning of period 2. As usual, renegotiation refers to situations where the conditions of the contract can be changed at the beginning of period 2 if both partners agree to do so. If the commitment not to renegotiate is not possible, the parties would anticipate the outcome of these renegotiations when determining the terms of the long term contract in period 1. Hence, only a subset of all possible linear contracts, namely those that are renegotiation proof, have to be considered by the principal when searching for the optimal long term contract 5 under such circumstances. Such a contract is characterized in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 If the manufacturer relies on a voice-based strategy, then in an optimal renegotiation proof long term contract the incentive rates in the two periods and the relative weight on the additional signalĉ are given by
whereσ 2 c is given by (11). The incentive rate in the first period is lower than and in the second period higher than in an optimal linear long term contract.
We do not give the full analytic expression for the expected overall price of the manufacturer in an optimal renegotiation proof long term contract. However, since renegotiation proof contracts are a subset of all linear contracts, it is clear that the manufacturer's expected price is larger than or equal to the expected price in the situation considered above, where the parties can commit not to renegotiate the contract terms (see proposition 2).
Comparison of Exit and Voice Relationships
Having described the optimal contracts in both exit and voice relationships, we are now in a position to compare the expected overall prices paid by the manufacturer in the two cases. Note first, that in a situation where c * is common knowledge the optimal long term contract is simply the repetition of identical optimal short term contracts and, accordingly, is also renegotiation proof; see Fudenberg et al. (1990) . This might suggest that in our framework voice relationships should be preferred by the principal because of their informational advantages. The additional signal obtained in a voice relationship reduces the uncertainty about the base cost level and, therefore, lowers the risk premium the manufacturer has to pay to the subcontractor. The following proposition shows, however, that this is only true if the signal is sufficiently precise.
Proposition 4 For 0 < σ 2 c,1 there exist threshold values 0 <σ 2 s <σ 2 s such that the following statements hold: (a) if the parties can commit not to renegotiate the terms of the contract, the manufacturer should enter a voice relationship if σ 2 s <σ 2 s , otherwise an exit relationship.
(b) if the parties cannot commit and renegotiations cannot be ruled out, the manufacturer should enter a voice relationship if σ 2 s <σ 2 s , otherwise an exit relationship.
With the help of this proposition we can now characterize the situations in which either one of the two strategies for supplier management, a voicebased strategy or an exit strategy, is preferable for the manufacturer. We can see that the fact whether the parties can commit not to renegotiate the contract terms or not has no impact on the comparison of exit and voice relationships in the sense that voice relationships (with or without renegotiations) are only preferable if the informational advantage is sufficiently large. On the other hand, exit relationships are strictly advantageous for the principal if the additional signal in the voice relationship is completely uninformative. The reason for this is the following. Since there is common uncertainty about the base cost level, the two cost values c 1 and c 2 of the two projects are positively correlated given the information at the beginning of period 1 6 . Thus, the conditional variance of the agent's net profit of the long term contract governing a voice relationship is larger than two times the conditional variance of c 1 . This 'correlation effect' leads to larger risk premiums in both periods and, as a consequence, the optimal incentive rate is decreased in the long term contract to compensate for this effect. As a result, the agency costs increase. The main insight our result provides is that in a situation characterized by common uncertainty relying on a voice-based strategy introduces two opposite effects, namely a positive information effect (due to increased flow of information between the manufacturer and its suppliers), but also a negative correlation effect. The optimal strategy (exit or voice) depends on whether the correlation or the information effect dominates and this in turn depends on the precision of the signal. As an illustration of these results, in figures 3a-c we compare incentive rates and expected prices for the three cases discussed before. Concerning the incentive rates, we observe that voice relationships yield stronger incentives only if the additional signal is very informative. Otherwise, optimal long term relationships are characterized by lower incentives and more risk sharing than exit partnerships.
Insert Figures 3a-c here
In a voice relationship governed by a long term contract there is a tradeoff between a positive effect due to the generation of additional information and a negative correlation effect which in fact increases the manufacturer's expected price. This raises the question whether a voice relationship based on an implicit long term contract but governed by one-period explicit contracts might be a better way to design the relationship between the man-ufacturer and the supplier. In this case information exchange is facilitated but, on the other hand, since the second period contract is determined at a point where the realization of c 1 is already known, no additional risk premium due to the correlation between c 1 and c 2 has to be taken into account. It is, however, easy to see that the principal cannot generate additional rents by governing a voice relationship with short term contracts.
Proposition 5 Assume that the partners enter a voice relationship (commitment for two periods) but write one-period contracts every period. If the manufacturer offers optimal one-period contracts, the expected overall price is identical to the expected overall price in the optimal renegotiation proof long term contract.
It should be pointed out that a critical assumption for this proposition is that the additional signalĉ is used in the first period short term contract. If short term contracts are used, the correlation effect is simply traded for the well known ratchet effect (see Milgrom and Roberts [1992] , Meyer [1995] , Meyer and Vickers [1997] ). Since the agent anticipates that high costs in period 1 increase the a posteriori expectation of the principal about c * , he expends less effort in period 1 in order to increase his base salary in period 2. In other words, the effort of the agent given the first period incentive rate decreases. On the other hand, the principal takes into account that the relationship will last for two periods. Hence, she in turn anticipates the corresponding reaction of the agent. She reacts by increasing the first period incentive rate, which reduces risk sharing and increases the risk premium. Note that with long term contracts the ratchet effect can be avoided, even if we allow for renegotiations. Although the value ofc 2 influences the expected payoff from the old contract at the time of the renegotiation, a change in this value leads simply to a transfer between the two players, which means that it can never lead to a Pareto improvement. Therefore, the agent has no incentives to increasec 2 and, accordingly, there are no implicit incentives here.
The result stated in the proposition shows that the additional risk premium due to the ratchet effect coincides exactly with the additional risk premium which is due to the correlation effect for renegotiation proof long term contracts. This should not come as a big surprise, since for an agent with CARA utility the reaction function in period 2 does not depend on the payoff in period 1. Therefore, in equilibrium, the optimal incentive rate in the second period can be perfectly predicted at the beginning of period 1 even if short term contracts are used. Accordingly, the different types of participation constraints that apply in the two cases make no difference. Of course, this result would not hold for more general utility functions.
Conclusions
As discussed in the introduction, it has already been pointed out in the existing literature on the optimal duration of supplier relationships that a main advantage of voice relationships is the better understanding of the design and production process due to increased information sharing. In this respect our findings that voice relationships are optimal if the quality of additional information generated is high are in accordance with these studies. The contribution of our analysis is to point out that even in environments where standard arguments for short term relationships like competitive bidding among suppliers or uncertainty about market development do not hold, long term relationships in combination with information sharing might not be the optimal choice for the manufacturer. Besides the standard arguments also a pure risk-sharing argument favors short term relationships, if at the beginning of the relationship there is some common uncertainty about the base cost level. The additional risk premium arising in a voice relationship has to be compared with the gain due to the additional information 7 in order to decide on the optimal mode of governance.
The predictions of our analysis, namely that voice relationships are only attractive if they lead to a significant increase in the quality of exchanged information, is backed by several empirical studies comparing subcontracting systems in the US and Japan. For example Dyer et al. (1998) report that in the US a doubling of the duration in supplier relationships leads to insignificant increase in information sharing. In terms of our model the quality of the additional informational signal created in a long term relationship is low. On the other hand, in the Japanese system the 'Partner' supplier share statistically significant more information with the manufacturers than arm's length suppliers. As predicted by our model, indeed the percentage of voice relationships in Japan is still larger than in the US, although the gap is closing. Helper and Sako (1995a) report that 87% of Japanese automobile parts suppliers expect the relationship with their main customer to last for more than 4 years (which is about the duration of a model life cycle and hence corresponds to one period in our model), whereas only 68% of US suppliers have this expectation.
This constraint is binding in equilibrium and we can express b E i in terms of
The principal wants to minimize the price she expects to pay in period i. Using (13) this amount can be expressed as
where IE i denotes the expectation conditional on the information of the players at the beginning of period i. Minimizing this expression yields the optimal incentive rate given in (6). Straightforward calculations now give the expected price. 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
The net profit of the agent after the two periods is
The certainty equivalent of the expected utility of such a contract for the agent, where the expectation is taken at the beginning of period 1, is
Maximizing this expression shows that the reaction functions of the agent are -like in the case of short term contracts governing exit relationshipsgiven by (12). Analogous to the previous case of exit relationships, knowing that the participation constraint is binding in equilibrium, we can use the equation CE = 2u 0 to express b V in terms of α V 1 and α V 2 in order to derive the following expression for the manufacturer's expected total price:
The principal chooses the incentive rates for both periods and the relative weight on the additional signalĉ such that this expression is minimized. Simple calculations give the results of the proposition. 2
Proof of Proposition 3
Consider an arbitrary long term contract
governing the voice relationship. Assume further that the principal deliberates to offer the agent a new contract of the formp =b V +α V 2 (c 2 −b V ) after c 1 andĉ have been observed. Since the agent has to agree to switch to the new contract, his expected utility from the new contract must be at least as high as his expected utility from the old one. The certainty equivalent of his expected utility from the old contract given c 1 ,ĉ and ξ 1 reads (after his reaction function in period 2 has been inserted)
Calculating the certainty equivalent of the new contract and equalizing the two values yields
Straightforward calculations show now that the conditional expected price stemming from the contractp is minimized for
Thus, if the principal offers a new contract after period 1, she offers one with incentive rate (1 −α V * 2 ). The difference in the expected overall costs of the two contracts conditional on the information available after period 1 is
The original contract is renegotiation proof if and only if this difference is non-negative. Sinceα V * 2 minimizes the expression
2 ) it is obvious that the difference is non-negative if and only if α V 2 =α V * 2 . Since every renegotiation proof contract must have this incentive rate in the second period, this must also be true for the optimal renegotiation proof contract and we have α V R * 2 =α V 2 . Identical arguments as those given in the discussion below proposition 2 establish that β should be chosen as β = − To determine the optimal first period incentive rate, the principal has to maximize (14) over (1 − α V 1 ) given α V R *
2
. From the first order condition we get
Since the incentive rate must be non-negative, the optimal rate is zero whenever this expression is negative. Inserting 1 − α V R * 2 gives the result stated in the proposition. Straightforward, but tedious calculations show that 1 − α V R * 2 is larger than the second period incentive rate in an optimal long term contract. Together with the first order condition for 1 − α V R 1 this establishes that 1 − α V R * 1 has to be smaller than the corresponding incentive rate in the optimal linear long term contract.
2
Proof of Proposition 4:
First, we show that if σ 2 s = 0 the expected overall price in a voice relationship governed by a renegotiation proof long term contract is smaller than in an exit relationship with two short term contracts. Considering proposition 2, we get that for σ 2 s = 0, the optimal incentive rates in a voice relationship are given by
Note also that since σ 2 s = 0 impliesσ 2 s = 0, from proposition 3 the same incentive rates as above are obtained for the case of renegotiation proof long term contracts. From (10) the resulting expected overall price reads
These expressions coincide with those from proposition 1 if σ 2 1,c = 0, i.e. if there is no a-priori common uncertainty. However, since the manufacturer's expected price in an exit relationship increases with increasing σ 2 1,c , we conclude that for σ 2 s = 0 and σ 2 1,c > 0 the expected price in a voice relationship (with or without renegotiations) is always smaller than in an exit relationship. On the other hand, we can infer from (10) that for σ 2 s = ∞ the expected price in a voice relationship governed by the optimal linear long term contract is given by
, and with respect to the expected price in an exit relationship the following result holds:
Furthermore, since the set of renegotiation proof linear long term contracts is a subset of all linear long term contracts, we can conclude that for σ 2
s , since in an exit relationship no signal is generated. Accordingly, all that remains to be shown is that IE 1 p V * and IE 1 p V R * are strictly increasing in σ 2 s . This is easy to see. Consider two valuesσ 2 s >σ 2 s and denote byα i andα i the corresponding optimal values of the incentive parameters and byp andp the resulting expected prices. Note first that, even if the principal holds on to the contract with parameter valuesα i , a reduction of the variance of the signal fromσ 2 s toσ 2 s reduces the risk premium and therefore the expected price. Choosing the optimal parameter valuesα i of course further reduces the expected price and thereforep >p. This argument applies no matter whether renegotiations can be ruled out or not and we have shown that both IE 1 p V * and IE 1 p V R * are strictly increasing in σ 2 s . A simple continuity argument now proves the claim of the proposition. 2
Proof of Proposition 5: It follows directly from the arguments given in the proof of proposition 3 that the optimal incentive rate in a second period short term contract (after c 1 andĉ have been observed) is equal to 1 − α V R * 2 and the resulting level of equilibrium effort is ξ * 2 = δ(1 − α V R *
2
) just like in a voice relationship with a long term (renegotiation-proof) contract. From the proof of proposition 1 we know that the target cost level in the second period is .
By inserting the expression for 1 − α V R * 2 it can be easily verified that this effective incentive rate is equal to 1 − α V R * 1 as given in proposition 3. This implies that the effective incentive rates in voice relationships which are governed by short term contracts -and therefore also the effort levels -are identical to those in voice relationships governed by one renegotiation-proof long term contract. Since the certainty equivalent given the information at the beginning of period 1 is 2u 0 in both cases, the sum of the constant terms in the short term contracts have to add up exactly to the constant used in the optimal renegotiation proof long term contract. Therefore these two contract forms are completely equivalent and also yield the same expected overall price for the principal. 
